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The securitization of subprime mortgage loans is widely viewed as a root cause of the
financial crisis. This lecture balances the costs and benefits of securitization, focusing on
what went wrong and on what needs to be fixed to curtail securitization’s abuses and
make it viable again as an important financing tool. Finally, the lecture examines
alternatives to securitization, focusing on covered bonds and comparing and contrasting
covered bonds and securitization.
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PART I
SECURITIZATION’S ROLE IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

The securitization of subprime mortgage loans is widely viewed as a
root cause of the financial crisis. In the United States, there was significant
government pressure on banks and other lenders to make home-mortgage
loans to expand home ownership, even for risky borrowers. These subprime
loans were often made, for example, to borrowers with little de facto
income, anticipating that home-value appreciation would enable the
borrowers to refinance to lower-rate mortgages. Historically, home prices
had generally been increasing in the United States since the Great
Depression.

But this model failed when, in 2007 and 2008, home prices fell
significantly. In one sense, the precipitous drop in home prices was
unexpected—like Monty’s Python’s skit, “Nobody expects the Spanish
Inquisition.” In another sense, though, the fall arguably should have been
anticipated based on the earlier liquidity glut and its artificially low interest
rates, driving up housing prices artificially.

As a result of the fall in home prices, borrowers who were relying on
refinancing for loan repayment could not refinance. Furthermore, many
subprime mortgage loans had adjustable rates which increased after an initial
“teaser” period. Borrowers who could not afford the rate increases had
expected to refinance at lower interest rates. That likewise was stymied by
collapsing home prices. For these reasons, many risky borrowers began
defaulting.
Leverhulme Lecture-The Future of Securitization

3

These defaults in turn caused substantial amounts of low-investmentgrade-rated mortgage-backed securities to default and the highest (“AAA”)
rated securities to be downgraded. That, in turn, spooked investors who
believed that “AAA” meant iron-clad safety and that “investment grade”
meant relative freedom from default. Investors started losing confidence in
ratings and avoiding all types of rated debt securities.

Fewer investors meant that the price of debt securities began falling.
Falling prices meant that firms using debt securities as collateral had to mark
them to market and put up cash, requiring the sale of more securities, which
caused market prices to plummet further downward in a death spiral. The
refusal in mid-September 2008 of the U.S. government to save Lehman
Brothers, and its resulting bankruptcy, added to this cascade. Investors lost
all confidence in debt markets, and even the short-term commercial paper
market virtually shut down.

The lack of debt financing meant that companies could no longer
grow and, in some cases, even survive. That affected the real economy and
led to the financial crisis.

PART II
ADDRESSING SECURITIZATION’S PROBLEMS

Because of its role in initially triggering the financial crisis,
securitization has been villainized. But prior to the crisis, and even now,
securitization is one of the primary mechanisms by which companies can
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obtain financing from the capital markets, bypassing high-cost
intermediaries such as banks—an approach known as “disintermediation.”

As a tool for disintermediation, securitization can more precisely
allocate risk with capital, avoiding middleman inefficiencies. It also can
enable companies to access capital markets directly, in most cases at lower
cost than the cost of issuing direct debt (such as bonds or commercial paper).
Moreover, when the securitized assets are loans (such as mortgage loans),
securitization can help to transform the loans into cash from which banks
and other lenders can make new loans. [Indeed, the function of the quasigovernmental firms, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the U.S. (discussed
yesterday during the Q&A period), has been to ensure this transformation
process occurs.]

These positives might be outweighed, however, by securitization’s
flaws revealed by the recent financial crisis. Whether securitization, even
with the flaws, created net positive value is an unresolved question. My goal
in this talk is not to attempt to answer that question. I merely examine how
to overcome these flaws.

There are at least four potential flaws: subprime mortgages may be a
problematic asset type that should not have been securitized; the originateto-distribute model of securitization might create moral hazard;
securitization can create servicing conflicts; and securitization can foster
overreliance on mathematical models.
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The financial crisis also revealed a possible fifth flaw: that investors
in securitization transactions may over-rely on rating-agency ratings. The
extent of appropriate reliance on ratings, and indeed the integrity of the
ratings process itself, are questions beyond the scope of today’s talk—
although I’m happy to discuss these questions during the Q&A at the end of
the talk.

My talk uses the following terminology:
Subprime mortgage loans (also called subprime mortgages) are loans
made to risky borrowers who use the proceeds to purchase homes and then
mortgage the homes as collateral; because the borrowers are risky, the
collateral is the primary source of repayment.
In the most basic form of mortgage securitization, mortgage-backed
securities (“MBS”) are issued by a special-purpose vehicle (“SPV”), and
payment on the securities is derived directly from collections on mortgage
loans owned by the SPV.
More complex forms of mortgage-backed securities include
collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) securities in which payment derives
directly from a mixed pool of mortgage loans and sometimes, also, other
financial assets owned by the SPV; and ABS CDO securities in which
payment derives from MBS and CDO securities owned by the SPV (and
thus indirectly from the mortgage loans and other financial assets underlying
those owned securities).
Subprime mortgage securitization can reference any of these financial
products, so long as all or a material portion of the underlying financial
assets consist of subprime mortgages.
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WHAT WENT WRONG, AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE FIXED?

A. Problematic Asset Type.
The failure of subprime mortgage securitization was caused by its
almost absolute dependence on home appreciation. Some believe this type of
particular sensitivity to declines in house prices was unique. From that
perspective, parties structuring securitization transactions can minimize
future problems by excluding, or at least limiting and better managing,
subprime mortgage loans as an eligible type of underlying financial asset,
and also by conservatively assessing the payment prognosis for other types
of financial assets underlying securitizations. This is important not only to
protect the integrity of securitization transactions but also to avoid the
unintended consequence that securitization of a problematic asset type can
motivate greater origination of that asset type.

This is not to say these procedures will be failsafe. Parties to (and
investors in) securitization transactions must always be diligent to recognize
and try to protect against the possibility that the underlying financial assets
might, as in the case of subprime mortgage loans, fail in unexpected ways.
What would happen to automobile loan securitization, for example, if a
technological innovation makes cars obsolete, depriving even financially
healthy borrowers of the incentive to repay their loans? The invention of a
new form of personal transportation is at least as plausible as the idea that
home prices—which generally had only risen since the 1930s—would
suddenly collapse in value at a rate higher than that seen during the Great
Depression (as happened in the recent financial crisis).
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The financial crisis also teaches us the danger of mixing politics and
finance. Before that crisis, there was political pressure to securitize risky
subprime mortgage loans to facilitate financing for the poor. We are likely to
see the same type of political pressure to securitize risky microfinance loans
to facilitate financing for the poor and disadvantaged, which I later discuss.

B. Originate-to-Distribute Moral Hazard.
Some argue that securitization facilitated an undisciplined mortgage
lending industry. By enabling mortgage lenders to sell off loans as they were
made (a concept called “originate-to-distribute”), securitization is said to
have created moral hazard since these lenders did not have to live with the
credit consequences of their loans. Mortgage underwriting standards
therefore fell, exacerbated by the fact that mortgage lenders could make
money on the volume of loans originated.

I find the moral hazard argument weak. Mortgage underwriting
standards may have fallen, but there are other explanations of why. For
example, lower standards may well reflect distortions caused by the liquidity
glut of that time, in which lenders competed aggressively for business,
allowed otherwise defaulting home borrowers to refinance, and (in the
corporate lending context) even made so-called ‘covenant-lite’ loans. The
fall in standards may also reflect conflicts of interest between lending-firms
and their employees in charge of setting those standards, such as where
employees were paid for booking loans regardless of the loans’ long-term
performance.

Blaming the originate-to-distribute model for lower mortgage
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underwriting standards also does not explain why standards were not
similarly lowered for originating non-mortgage financial assets used in other
types of securitization transactions. Nor does it explain why the ultimate
beneficial owners of the mortgage loans—the investors in the mortgagebacked securities—did not govern their investments by the same strict
lending standards that they would observe but for the separation of
origination and ownership (although I observed in yesterday’s lecture that
this failure may at least partly be explained by (i) the inherent inadequacy of
disclosure for the most complex (ABS CDO) mortgage-backed securities;
(ii) the possibly excessive diversification of risk created by these securities,
undermining any given investor’s incentive to monitor; and (iii) the
tendency of investors to engage in herd behavior).

Although I don’t believe the originate-to-distribute model was a
significant cause of the financial crisis, the model may need fixing to avoid
its perception as the cause. There is little question, though, that the model
should remain basically intact; it is critical to the underlying funding
liquidity of banks and corporations, and empirical evidence tentatively
indicates that it creates net value. The goal therefore should be to minimize
any potential moral hazard resulting from the originate-to-distribute model
without undermining the model’s basic utility.

There are various ways this might be done. Potential moral hazard
problems could be managed, for example, by requiring mortgage lenders and
other originators to retain some realistic risk of loss. This is the central
approach of the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S., although we have already
discussed in these lectures how this can lead to a ‘mutual misinformation’
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problem.

Moral hazard problems also could be managed by regulating loan
underwriting standards. The United States took this type of approach, for
example, in response to the margin-loan underwriting failures that helped
trigger the Great Depression. When stock values began depreciating in 1929,
margin loans (that is, loans to purchase publicly-listed stock) became
undercollateralized, resulting in a high loan default rate which, in turn,
caused bank lenders to fail. To protect against a recurrence of this problem,
the Federal Reserve promulgated margin regulations G, U, T, and X,
requiring margin lenders to maintain minimum two-to-one collateral
coverage.

A similar type of approach applied to home-mortgage loans would
certainly protect against a repeat of the recent crisis. That protection would
come at a high price, though, potentially impeding and increasing the cost of
home ownership and imposing an administrative burden on lenders and
government monitors.

C. Servicing Conflicts.
Mortgage securitization made it difficult to work out problems with
the underlying mortgage loans because the beneficial owners of the loans are
no longer the mortgage lenders but a broad universe of investors in the
mortgage-backed securities. Servicers theoretically bridge the gap between
investors (as beneficial owners of the loans) and the mortgage lenders,
retaining the power to restructure the underlying loans “in the best interests”
of those investors; but the reality is problematic.
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Servicers may be reluctant to engage in a restructuring, for example, if
there is uncertainty whether their costs will be reimbursed; whereas
foreclosure costs are relatively minimal. Servicers may also prefer
foreclosure over restructuring because foreclosure is more ministerial and
thus has lower litigation risk. Restructuring can involve difficult decisions.
For example, in a mortgage securitization transaction in which cash flows
deriving from principal and interest are separately allocated to different
investor classes, or ‘tranches,’ a restructuring that reduces the interest rate
would adversely affect investors in the interest-only tranche (and likewise, a
restructuring that reduces principal would adversely affect investors in the
principal-only tranche). This leads to what some have called “tranche
warfare”—a bad pun on Armistice Day!

These problems can, and in the future should, be fixed. Parties should
write underlying deal documentation that sets clearer and more flexible
guidelines and more certain reimbursement procedures for loan
restructuring, especially when restructuring appears to be superior to
foreclosure. Parties also should try to minimize allocating cash flows to
investors in ways that create conflicts. Furthermore, I have argued that nonconflicted servicers that engage in restructuring in good faith should be
protected, perhaps akin to the type of protection afforded corporate directors
under a business judgment rule.

D. Overreliance on Mathematical Models.
To some extent the financial crisis resulted from an abandonment of
common sense and an overreliance on complex mathematical models.
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Models are essential to securitization because of the need to statistically
predict what future cash flows will become available from the underlying
financial assets to pay the mortgage-backed securities.2

Models can bring insight and clarity. If the model is realistic and the
inputted data are reliable, models can yield accurate predictions of real
events. However, if the model is unrealistic or the inputted data are
unreliable, models can be misleading—creating the danger of “garbage in,
garbage out.”

Subprime mortgage securitization models relied on assumptions and
historical data which, in retrospect, turned out to be incorrect and therefore
made the valuations incorrect. We discussed yesterday the limitations of the
value-at-risk (VaR) model. The securitization models also incorrectly
assumed that housing would not depreciate in value to the levels later seen.
Valuation errors were compounded to the extent mortgage loans increasingly
were made with innovative terms, such as adjustable rates, low-to-zero down
payment requirements, interest-only payment options, and negative
amortization. These terms were so complex that some borrowers did not
fully understand the risks they were incurring. As a result, they defaulted at a
much higher rate than would be predicted by the historical mortgage-loan
default rates relied on by loan originators in extending credit.

Securitization models also have been used, sometimes erroneously, to
substitute for real market information. For example, some highly-leveraged
2

My use of the term ‘mortgage-backed securities’ is meant to be illustrative, not
exclusive; securitization embraces securities backed by any form of financial assets.
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ABS CDO securities did not have an active trading market, so investors
instead relied on mark-to-model valuation of these securities. When
assumptions underlying the models turned out to be wrong, investors
panicked because they did not know what the securities were worth.

In theory, this overreliance on mathematical models is self-correcting
because the recent crisis, by its very existence, has shaken faith in the
market’s ability to analyze and measure risk through models. Securitization
products are likely to be confined, at least in the near future, to those that can
be robustly modeled. The only question will be the longevity of the lesson
that future risks cannot always be predicted through mathematical models.

PART III
THE FUTURE OF SECURITIZATION

A. General Observations.
Because securitization, properly utilized, is an efficient financial tool,
its future should be assured no matter how investors or politicians might
temporarily overreact. Nonetheless, in the near future at least, it is likely that
securitization transactions will need to refocus on basic structures and asset
types in order to attract investors.

To this end, there likely will (and, I believe, should) be an emphasis
on cash-flow securitizations in which there are the traditional “two-ways
out.” An example of this would be the securitization of prime mortgages, in
which payment can come from the borrower or the collateral.
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Furthermore, we are not likely to see many highly complex
securitization products, like ABS CDO transactions, which magnify
leverage.

But there are exciting potential new applications of securitization,
such as to microfinance. Microfinance refers to providing small loans and
other proportionally sized financial services to low-income individuals and
the poor, in order to enable them to start or expand small businesses.
Microfinance loans are now being made domestically and around the world,
with estimates of between $20 and $60 billion outstanding. As a result of
microfinance’s success, the need for microfinance lending vastly exceeds the
amount of funds that can be raised from charitable donors. It has been
estimated, for example, that of the one-and-a-half billion people potentially
eligible for microfinance loans, only a hundred million people—less than
seven percent—receive them.

To satisfy this demand, commercial banks have become vital funding
sources for microfinance loans in many countries. But many of these banks
are charging exorbitant rates of interest, with some charging interest rates of
100 percent or more.

I have recently argued that securitization can, and indeed should, be
applied to microfinance to disintermediate the need for commercial banks.
Even profit motivated investors should want to invest in microfinance
lending as a means of diversifying their portfolios, thereby protecting
themselves from market risk. The challenge, though, is to ensure that
microfinance securitization transactions are structured with the lessons of the
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failure of subprime mortgage securitization in mind,3 and to resist political
pressures to cut corners.

In the medium term, securitization’s future will be at least marginally
influenced by the extent to which the intrinsic values of mortgage-backed
securities turn out to be worth more than their market values. I have argued
that, as a result of irrational panic, the market prices of mortgage-backed
securities originally collapsed substantially below the intrinsic value of the
mortgage loans underlying those securities. A large differential would
indicate that the problem was more investor panic than intrinsic lack of
worth; although the subsequent collapse of the real economy to some extent
has made the price collapse a self-fulfilling prophecy by causing even prime
borrowers to lose their jobs and default.

Whether securitization will remain vibrant and inventive in the long
term, however, will turn on our ability to better understand the problems of
complexity, which was at the root of many of the failures that gave rise to
the financial crisis. Complexity was the subject of yesterday’s Leverhulme
Lecture.

B. Alternatives to Securitization.
Covered bonds, which have a long history in European securities
markets, are being widely touted as an alternative to securitization. By the

3

See Disintermediating Avarice: A Legal Framework for Commercially Sustainable
Microfinance, forthcoming 2011 U. ILLINOIS L. REV., issue 4, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612766 (discussing ‘Risk of Loss’ in Part III.F thereof).
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end of 2008, the amount of covered bonds outstanding in Europe alone was
approximately 2.38 trillion euros, up from 1.5 trillion euros in 2003.

There is no formal international convention or treaty defining covered
bonds. They are instead defined, de facto, by their characteristics.
Essentially they are long-term debt securities that are secured by specific
assets of the issuer of the bonds. The assets so constituting collateral are
called “cover-pool” assets. To the extent the cover-pool assets are
insufficient to repay principal and interest on the covered bonds, investors in
the bonds have an unsecured claim against the issuer for the insufficiency
(‘dual recourse’).

As with any granting of collateral, the cover-pool assets are deemed to
remain on the issuer’s balance sheet (i.e., they remain owned by the issuer)
for accounting purposes. Unlike normal collateral, however, these assets are
“ring-fenced”—effectively segregated from the issuer’s estate—to give
covered bondholders greater protection in the event of the issuer’s
bankruptcy. Additionally, weak cover-pool assets are required to be replaced
by good-quality assets throughout the life of the covered bonds, thereby
maintaining a requisite level of “overcollateralization”—a surplus of
collateral value over indebtedness.

To ensure this is all enforceable by covered bondholders against other
creditors of the issuer, some countries have promulgated specific covered
bond legislation (a “legislative” covered bond regime). Absent such
legislation, covered bondholders must rely on contractual protections and
related commercial law (a “structured” covered bond regime).
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Covered bond and securitization transactions have significant
similarities. The most important is that both strive for bankruptcy
remoteness—the goal of protecting covered bond investors in the event of
the issuer’s bankruptcy. Covered bond transactions strive to achieve
bankruptcy remoteness through ring-fencing or by legislative fiat.
Securitization transactions achieve bankruptcy remoteness by having the
company originating the receivables (the “originator”) transfer those
receivables, in a “true sale” under bankruptcy law, to a bankruptcy-remote
SPV—steps that can parallel ring-fencing.

Another important similarity is that after covered bondholders are
paid in full, and also after securitization investors are paid in full, any
residual value from the transferred assets is returned for the benefit of other
creditors.

There are, however, several differences between covered bonds and
securitization. A primary distinction is that covered bonds have dual
recourse, whereas securitization constitutes non-recourse financing. Another
distinction is that, in covered bond transactions, the cover-pool assets
typically remain on the issuer’s balance sheet for accounting purposes
whereas, in securitization transactions, it has been more typical for the
transfer of assets from the originator to the SPV to be accounted for as a
sale.

This accounting distinction is somewhat artificial, however.
Securitization transactions can be—and increasingly are—structured as onLeverhulme Lecture-The Future of Securitization
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balance-sheet transactions. The absence of an accounting benefit does not
undermine securitization’s key fundraising and risk-transfer functions. The
dual recourse distinction, however, is more critical.

Securitization, much like a new-money loan, would not harm
unsecured creditors of a company to the extent it entails the exchange of one
type of asset (e.g. mortgage loans, automotive loans, or other financial
assets) for another asset, cash. But unsecured creditors can fare differently
when a company issues covered bonds. Covered bonds are roughly
equivalent to a securitization in their neutral immediate impact—unsecured
creditors would only be harmed to the extent a covered bond issue increases
the issuer’s chance of bankruptcy or there is overinvestment of the proceeds
of the bond issue. Covered bonds, however, go beyond securitization in two
ways that can harm unsecured creditors.

In a securitization, if the overcollateralization is insufficient to repay
investors, the investors suffer a loss because they only have recourse to
assets that the SPV has already purchased. The pool of assets available for
repayment is, in other words, effectively fixed or static. In contrast, in
covered bond transactions, the cover pools are usually dynamic, requiring
the covered bond issuer to continually segregate new assets as needed to
maintain overcollateralization—thereby enabling the covered bonds to
continue to be paid in priority to unsecured claims.

Covered bonds also go beyond securitization in their recourse.
Whereas securitization transactions are non-recourse, covered bonds have
dual recourse. If, therefore, the cover-pool assets are insufficient, covered
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bondholders have a recourse claim against the issuer. That claim, being pari
passu with unsecured creditor claims, would further dilute unsecured
creditor recovery.

As a result of the dynamic cover pool and dual recourse, covered bond
transactions thus shift virtually all risk to unsecured creditors. The extent to
which risk should be allocated so asymmetrically is an important policy
question that should be addressed by any governments and market
participants exploring covered bonds as an alternative to securitization.
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